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Abstract
In this post-modern world, there is a recognisable bent in the media to promote the idea of youth (read as 
synonymous with beauty and power) to the fullest. The result is that public perceptions of the normal bodily 
processes of aging are viewed as detrimental or unattractive. Since we are “social creatures”, as Aristotle 
put it, the mediasation, for example, in magazines, TV, film, fashion, music, etc. of youth as ideal is bound to 
impact upon our individual ideas of ‘what-is-good-for-me’. Since youth is viewed by society as a good, it is 
possible to understand an individual’s desire to take advantage, when it is possible, of the cosmetic proce-
dures that fortify this ideal. Moreover, since medical practitioners are part of the public, and no more or less 
swayed by such ideologies, it is also reasonable to assume that some will advantage themselves and take up 
the gauntlet of promoting youth, although perhaps in the more medical guise of ‘remedying the ills of aging’  
in other words, enter the practice of cosmetic surgery.  
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Discussion
While the mediasation of youth and beauty may be recognisable as 
part of our daily lives, and setting aside the question of why it is so 
and why we as society feed this frenzy, there is something unsettling 
in this phenomenon. This is particularly so if one considers the idea 
that, at one stage in most societies, older or elderly individuals were 
considered ‘persons of respect’ – most likely because of their wisdom 
gained through life experiences. Then we might think about how and 
why this change occurred. In this discussion, however, we will set such 
issues aside and rather focus on two different aspects concerning the 
ethics of cosmetic surgery: 
1. holding it to the goals of medicine 
2. an interrogation of the terms ‘patient’ and ‘consumer’
We will discuss each of these points and conclude that cosmetic 
surgery, as we use the term, does not fit into the currently accepted 
goals of medicine, but lies more on the periphery. That being said, 
we will suggest that those persons who practice cosmetic surgery 
are nonetheless bound by the same ethical guidelines as other, more 
traditionally-located medical practitioners. 
The four goals of medicine, as articulated by the Hastings Center, are: 
1.  the prevention of disease and injury and promotion and 
maintenance of health
2. the relief of pain and suffering caused by maladies
3.  the care and cure of those with a malady and the care of those who 
cannot be cured
4.  the avoidance of premature death and the pursuit of a peaceful 
death.1 Mainstream medical practice falls within and defines these 
goals. However, cosmetic surgery fails to meet this normative 
concept.  
The parameters of this term are broadly set out as ‘cosmetic surgery’. 
In using this term we refer to all procedures “performed to reshape 
normal structures of the body or to adorn parts of the body, with the 
aim of improving the consumer’s appearance and self-esteem; as 
initiated by the consumer and excluding reconstructive surgery which 
is generally performed to improve functions or done to approximate a 
normal appearance”.2   
Referring to this definition, we intend to highlight two of possibly more 
rising ethical issues in this article. The first is the replacement of the 
classic term patient with that of consumer. The second is the reliance 
on the initiation of a procedure from a consumer as opposed to that of 
a professional medical judgment based on necessity or need. Together 
they have relevance to the doctor-patient relationship, which is directly 
linked to the goals of medicine. In the cosmetic surgery industry, the 
notion of being a ‘patient’ is unsettled. Holding to the goals of medicine 
– a consensus reached by those practicing in the field and which 
reflects the ideals, current state of knowledge, technology and the 
norms of society – we can see that cosmetic surgery falls short. One 
major reason that it does so is because the goals of medicine do not 
support desire. By desire, we refer to a patient-initiated procedure that 
has no medical indication, as opposed to that of a judgment based on 
medical necessity or need. That being said, one is obliged to recognise 
that the goals of medicine are not stagnant, they have changed and 
will change over time, but which is not to trivialise them as moral ideals. 
Simply because, at this particular time and place, cosmetic surgery 
does not fit into the parameters of medicine does not mean that it 
never will.  
The distinction between the terms ‘patient’ and ‘consumer’ are 
important when we contrast the practice of medicine and the practice 
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of business. The idea that consumers are sovereign is fundamental to 
a market economy. This is because personal preference and capital 
largely determine access to a product or service. Concerning the use 
of the term ‘consumer’, this conceptual shift may represent the way in 
which society views the practice of medicine. Should this be the case, 
then the medical profession should take heed. Indeed, the supplanting 
of the term is ethically tenuous. To regard patients as consumers is ill 
conceived. Deeper reflection requires us to interrogate the meaning of 
the term ‘consumer’.  
Let us suppose you decide that you want an espresso machine. You go 
to a store and initiate a purchase. Unfortunately, when you return home 
and plug it in, it fails to function. You have 30 days in which to return 
it to the shop for a refund or repair (keeping with all the requirements 
necessary for its return). In the notion of consumer sovereignty, the 
objective of the business is to make you, the consumer (or customer), 
satisfied. So the business has a motive for promoting your satisfaction, 
in this case accepting the return of the espresso machine. If you are a 
satisfied customer, then you will return the machine to that store and 
consume more goods. Generally, we could say that the consumption 
of goods ensures that a business makes a profit; the more goods 
consumed, the greater the profit. Simply put, making you happy, 
fulfilling your desires as a consumer, becomes a business goal in as 
much as a business enterprise needs you to ensure its continued 
prosperity. Of course, the notion of consumer sovereignty also 
presupposes a society in which there are embedded means by which 
consumers’ rights (their justified claims to a thing) can be fulfilled.  
Is it then correct to equate ‘consumers’ of cosmetic surgery with those 
purchasing espresso machines? From a business stance, to have 
one’s products consumed and to have satisfied consumers are pivotal 
to business success.3 Is the practice of cosmetic surgery the same? 
Certainly, to satisfy one’s customers with a new nose shape or lack of 
wrinkles does equal a bonus to the cosmetic surgeon. So they may be 
considered similar. Moreover, both are fed by the media in the creation 
of desire for a thing, and both purchases are initiated by an individual 
(as opposed to a recommendation by a medical practitioner). While 
business practices are assuredly open to ethical scrutiny, for example 
through the hypothetical social contract between business and society, 
the idea that medical practice is somehow fundamentally different has 
it roots dating back to (at least) the Ancient Greeks.  
Personal intimacy or patient-as-person-centeredness is intrinsic to 
the practice of medicine. For doctor and patient, it is morally bound by 
trust. Trust in one’s doctor includes reliance upon his or her scientific 
knowledge and experience. In this framework, although patients may 
insist on special medical interventions, their demands are ultimately 
held, for example, to medical indications, diagnostic criteria, evidence-
based therapies, and professional judgment. In other words, whereas 
patients may ask or even demand certain procedures, they are not 
given carte blanche for the treatment or procedure, even if they 
indicate a willingness to pay for such.4  
The practice of medicine has always been regarded as a moral 
enterprise, as it is born and nurtured in a personal relationship between 
a doctor and a patient. This is in stark contrast to the relationship 
between a business and a consumer. There is no question of our life 
being in jeopardy or of how we view our physical appearance involved 
in the purchase of, for example, an appliance. The salesperson and 
you are morally distanced, you do not impart your anxieties, fears 
or needs to him or her; he or she is not the guardian of any of your 
stories. But the cosmetic surgeon is privy to such intimate information 
and as such is not removed from the ethical requirements of medical 
practice. 
Moreover, missing in the business-consumer relationship is the ethical 
notion of vulnerability. Central to medical practice is the idea that 
persons seeking medical services, that is, persons in need of medical 
intervention in a disease process when in pain or for preventive 
knowledge, are particularly vulnerable because of the intrinsic 
asymmetrical power relationship that exists between doctors and 
patients. Of course, the level and extent of a patient’s vulnerability are 
not carved in stone. Admittedly, in cases where a patient may consult 
his or her doctor for a routine check-up or seek advice, the medical, as 
well as psychological, circumstances of the patient do not necessarily 
feed into the doctor’s powerbase. Yet they can, and because of the 
recognition of patient vulnerability, ethical notions such as informed 
consent, truth telling and confidentiality all are in a moral sense 
inexorably bound to the practice of medicine. 
The idea of patient vulnerability is apparent in cosmetic surgery, as 
the reasons that motivate a person to seek cosmetic interventions 
may be largely psychosocial. This links to our own autonomy or what 
it means for each of us to be our own person. What it means to be a 
person for each of us includes our personal world-views, ways of life 
and the reasons we give to justify our actions. Such reasons are part of 
our own life story, part of our personal identity, and we are shaped, for 
good or ill, by the mediasation of certain ideologies aimed largely at the 
ideal of youthfulness. This results in the anomaly of the appearance of 
aging being regarded as undesirable and the desire to meet a socially 
determined concept of ‘beautiful youth’. In keeping, it is important 
to note that cosmetic surgery goes beyond questions concerning 
explanations and understandings by the patient about ‘what may go 
wrong’. Because consultation comes from a patient’s desire, whatever 
the motivation, the cosmetic surgeon is morally obliged to consider 
the cost-benefit burden with particular care. The reason for this is that 
cosmetic surgery involves a delicate balance between the psychosocial 
aspects (what is good for me) of one’s life as experienced through 
one’s own personal identity (who I am in the world).  
Cosmetic surgery, although (arguably) not included in mainstream 
medical practice, is obliged to adhere to the same ethical principles 
and guidelines that govern all medical disciplines. It too is held to the 
rules, duties and principles that underlie the moral practice of medicine, 
e.g. professionalism, advertising, respect for the patient’s autonomous 
choices, avoiding doing unnecessary harm, actively to do good, and to 
fully inform the patients concerning benefits and burdens.5,6 And here 
we have purposely used the term ‘patient’ as we suggest it should 
remain: ‘one who bears a burden’.  
“The sick person is a patient, not a consumer, client, or customer. 
A patient, as the etymology of the word indicates, is one who bears 
a burden, one who suffers. The patient brings his burden to the 
physician, asks for help, is offered help, and expects to be helped and 
not injured. In this vulnerable state, patients are morally entitled to 
protection from exploitation by the person who invites their trust.”7
Conclusions
From a few of the many issues involved in cosmetic surgery we 
have tried to show that it is more complex than perhaps is thought, 
particularly in that it involves how individuals view themselves in 
relation to socially created constructs. We have pointed out that 
cosmetic surgery, when held to the goals of medicine, falls short 
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in that it emanates from the desire of the patient. Finally, we have 
set out some problems in the shift in terminology from ‘patient’ to 
‘consumer’, suggesting that it is worrisome in relation to medicine as 
a moral enterprise. Finally, we have shown some ways in which those 
who practice cosmetic surgery are bound to the same ethical rules, 
guidelines and principles that govern all medical practice: patient trust 
and professional integrity define the parameters of morality in medicine 
– including in cosmetic surgery.   
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